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Abstract
We look into the role of financial intermediation in inducing the European financial crisis
of 2008 by exploring the effects of overall lending, and the allocation of credit to specific
categories of borrowers, namely households vs. firms. We find that for the EU26 during the
period 1995-2008, excessive household leverage through mortgage lending exerted a “crowding-
out” effect on availability of credit to support innovation and productive investment. The
crowding out effect ultimately translated into a GDP growth that was decoupled from real
household income. In this article we explain that shifting credit towards mortgages and away
from corporate projects is consistent with rational behaviour based on historical trends aimed at
minimizing short-term risk for each individual bank. Nevertheless, as a whole, the sum of
individual risk-reducing attitudes generated a long-term systemic risk.
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21. Introduction
Kindleberger’s seminal work on mania panics and crashes stresses the fact that the
world’s economy is subject to more or less regular cycles of inescapable booms and busts
(Aliber and Kindleberger, 2015). The economy slowdown that hit Europe and the world in
2007/2008 is the very last of the
crises the world has faced. Even if we assume that in a financial crisis there are some
inevitable components, it is anyway beneficial to investigate its causes. Our research focuses on
the role of banks’ behaviour - in particular their decision of expanding lending in general, as well
as expanding lending to households as opposed to firms - as factors that stimulated unbalanced
economic development (biased towards consumption and non-productive assets such as
properties) and ultimately induced/amplified the European financial crisis of 2008. In order to
investigate the topic, we rely on two major approaches that describe the role of the financial
system on economic growth, namely the “finance-led” and the “structural root” approaches.
The “finance-led” approach explores the role of financial institutions as channels that
stimulate the economy by providing credit. Empirical evidence based on this approach shows
that financial intermediation has been detached from the real sector (Haiss et al., 2016), that bank
credit had a negative effect on short-run growth (Narayan and Narayan, 2013) and that cross
border financial flows have been an underlining factor of the financial crisis (Baldwin and
Giavazzi, 2015). Previous research also explored the finance-induced crises caused by general
excessive lending (Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) and by
financial innovation gone bad, that is new financial products, such as collateralized debt
securities, that adversely affected the economy (Brunnermeier, 2009). Closer to our area is the
research that examined bank practices of lending to households, primarily in the form of
3mortgage lending, without considering income standards (Jordà et al., 2016; Mian and Sufi,
2014). The major criticism of the “finance-led” approach in explaining the financial crisis is that
it only focuses on the amount of finance, thus failing to account for ex-ante financial distortions
in the economy, where by distortion we mean the mis-allocation of finance among the different
economic actors (firms vs. households). The second approach we rely on, the “structural-roots”,
argues that the excessive financial lending to households was the ex-post policy implemented as
a response to the pre-existing low levels of household income and productive investment (Barba
and Pivetti, 2009; Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010; Stiglitz et al., 2009; Wisman, 2013). By
increasing lending to households in order to stimulate the economic growth, the financial system
kept artificially high both the demand of products and the demand of non-productive assets
(namely properties). Evidence of the structural-roots approach can be found in the fact that high
leverage and low interest rates (forces that typically stimulate inflation) did not create inflation,
suggesting an economy in need of higher leverage in order to achieve greater GDP growth
(Summers, 2014).
In line with the finance-growth literature which investigates the links of finance to
sources of growth such as capital formation, investment and productivity (Arcand et al., 2015;
Beck et al., 2000; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011) we test an
empirical model that expands the above mentioned finance-led and the structural-roots
approaches to shed light on the causal mechanism between finance and growth/crisis. We use
disaggregated data of financial development, capital formation and income for the 26 EU
members between 1995 and 2008 and rely on GMM dynamic panel estimation techniques
(where lag variables are used as valid instruments in accordance to the Arellano and Bond (1991)
4approach), as well as a Fixed Effects-2SLS simultaneous regressions, to establish results. Both
methods used aim at alleviating the finance/growth predicament of endogeneity.
We find that excessive household leverage, based on mortgages, supported households’
investment in non-productive assets (i.e. residential properties), and exerted “crowding-out”
effects on finance to firms (i.e. investment on assets that can be allocated to production and
innovation). In other words, we find that in the pre-crisis period, banks mis-allocated funds by
expanding lending to households at the expense of firms. Such a behavior stimulated an
economic growth where GDP growth was decoupled from real household income: while the
GDP was marginally increasing, household real income was decreasing and their debt was
increasing. Furthermore, we find that the effects of household leverage are valid for both the
financially developed and developing EU members even if the former suffered the greatest
negative effects of excessive household leverage. As firms in financially developed countries
were accustomed to rely more heavily on banks for project financing, the credit constraints
imposed by shifting lending towards households bore the greatest consequences. In contrast, for
financially developing countries, firms’ growth supported by debt was reduced. Thus, in the
latter case, shifting lending from capital formation (firms) to unproductive assets (household)
had a marginal negative impact on firm’s capability to invest in productive assets so that the
growth enjoyed by the country (in terms of GDP) benefitted only very marginally the
households.
Our results tend to reject the pure “financial-led” argument that the cause of financial
crisis is a general excessive lending sic et simpliciter. However, our results tend also to reject the
“structural roots” argument in its basic stand-alone form. Intriguingly, we find evidence that both
the “financial-led” and the “structural-roots” arguments have their merits: both excessive lending
5and misallocation of the credit is found to be the ex-ante reason of the financial crisis. Our
analysis suggests that while finance in the form of lending to households may initially boost
aggregate demand and consumption, when it is not allocated to support capital formation, it does
not find its way back into the household through the production cycle. The financial
development does not necessarily create the conditions in terms of investment for the creation of
the required income to repay for the accumulated debt (Turner, 2015). What affects a balanced
economic development is the way in which finance is allocated and used together with the
amount of finance injected in the system that affects a balanced economic development.
The paper contributes to the literature by helping to clarify the role of financial
intermediation in inducing the European financial crisis of 2008. By investigating the links
behind finance, capital formation and growth we illustrate the mechanisms behind the
decoupling of GDP growth from household income growth (Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Wisman,
2013), show how financial intermediation can be detached from the real sector (Haiss et al.,
2016); and explain the ways in which bank credit may exert a negative effect on long-run growth
(Narayan and Narayan, 2013). The evidence derived from this study stresses how bank-specific
financing choices that are perfectly rational in the short term can structurally distort an economy
and lead to unsustainable growth by not letting credit take its economic function of stimulus to
productive investments. We show that excessive finance is not a mere byproduct of an era
characterized by reduced productive investment and the divergence paths of household income to
GDP, or that finance, as such, causes instability in a structurally sound system. Instead, we show
that excessive and rapid credit allocation towards households and mortgages and the related
constrained access to credit for firms can have structural implications on the economy.
6The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 illustrates previous
research, section 3 details the variable construction while section 4 presents descriptive statistics
and discusses the estimation methods. Section 5 shows the results, section 6 provides the relevant
discussion and section 7 concludes.
2. Literature Review
In the last ten years a good amount of research looked at the causes of the economic and
financial crisis. Research finds that total factor productivity (TFP) has an impact on country
growth (OECD, 2009) and their capability to catch up (Banerjee and Jesenko, 2015; Kim and
Park, 2018). It stresses that financial development is a key factor in pushing TFP (Arizala et al.,
2013; Han and Shen, 2015) and that financial misallocation is a factor that affects the TFP (Dias
et al., 2015). In addition, research investigates the impact of the financial crisis on TFP (Chouard
et al., 2014; Ollivaud and Turner, 2015; Sandliers and Wright, 2014). All in all, a large body of
previous research explains that, on the one hand, financial development affects TFP growth and
on the other, a financial crisis adversely affects TFP. A factor that remains under-investigated in
assessing the relation of financial development and economic growth/crisis is the allocation of
financial resources to different types of investments. Our intention is to expand the work of De
Long et al. (1992) and De Long and Summers (1991) who explain the diverse impact of
investment in property and investment in equipment on GDP growth, total factor productivity
(TFP) growth and social returns. While these studies do distinguish between different types of
investment, they do not consider the role of finance, which is the area we intend to explore with
our work.
7Research that explores the links between finance and economic development/crisis can be
grouped in two major themes: the “finance-led” growth (and crisis) approach, and the “structural
roots” approach.
The “finance led” approach has its origins in Schumpeter’s seminal work on the prudent
intermediary. He argues that financial agents acquire and evaluate information on firms and
investment projects, and in doing so they allocate credit to the most productive uses
(Schumpeter, 1934). This idea has been developed further into the concept of the financial
institutions as delegated monitors (Diamond, 1984), i.e. actors who deal with risk and promote
growth by mobilizing and optimally allocating financial resources (savings) in an efficient and
productive manner. According to this approach, the financial system may play a very important
role in supporting the economic development by granting good firms and good projects the
access to the finance they need (for an overview of the finance-growth nexus pre-mid 1990’s era
see Levine (2005)). Building on the framework provided by Barro (1991), King and Lavine
(1993), are among the first to show empirically that financial development promotes long-run
growth in terms of GDP implicitly supporting Schumpeter’s theory. The nexus is also confirmed
by research based on microeconomic data at industry and firm level, that shows that in more
financially developed countries, finance dependent industries grow faster (Rajan and Zingales,
1998; Wurgler, 2000). Interestingly, higher ratios of total private sector credit to GDP are also
found to have a positive impact on total factor productivity growth and ultimately on GDP
growth suggesting a positive effect of increased household access to finance (and consumption)
on economic growth (Beck et al., 2000). Financial development, understood as new and more
efficient financial system, is also found to affect growth through both the channels of investment
and capital accumulation (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000) and improved productivity (Calderón
8and Liu, 2003). In fact, previous research challenges such a simplified role of financial
deepening, arguing that there are thresholds in terms of financial deepening that benefit society
in terms of economic growth and inequality reduction (Kose et al., 2011). Along this line, recent
research on Europe suggests that financial development may also reduce inequality by
supporting economic development: countries with more developed financial markets (financial
deepening) are found to reach greater levels of social equality, at relatively lower income levels,
compared to countries with less developed financial systems (Baiardi and Morana, 2018, 2016).
Research additionally suggests that the legal system and regulation influence the use of finance
(La Porta et al., 1998, 1997; Moro et al., 2016): the financial standardization between the EU-15
member States positively affected output growth through the increased efficiency of financial
intermediation until 2001 (Galindo et al., 2007) while banking harmonization improved bank
portfolios and credit allocation. However, the positive relationship between finance and growth
(the “financial-led” growth) is challenged by indications of a link between financial liberalization
and banking crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999): excessive debt linked to greater
liberalization may cause financial instability leading to a historical pattern of boom and bust
cycles (Jordà et al., 2016; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Relatively recent empirical evidence
suggests a vanishing and eventually detrimental effect of finance on growth. For instance,
Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) provide support to King and Levine’s results for period 1960-1989
(King and Lavine, 1993) but they also stress that the positive effect of financial depth on growth
vanishes completely for the subsequent period of 1990-2004. This evidence raises questions
about whether financial liberalization may inhibit rather than assure a sustainable GDP growth
through the finance-entrepreneurship-innovation process. Haiss et al. (2016) provide evidence
that financial intermediation (the part of the economy that is concerned with buying and selling
9on the financial markets) in Europe has been detached from the real sector (the part of the
economy that is concerned with producing goods and services) adversely affecting growth.
Narayan and Narayan (2013) find, that bank credit has a negative effect on short-run growth for
both a panel of 65 developing countries and a subset of European countries for the period of
1995-2011. However, research fails to find support for the bank-led growth hypothesis for a
panel including the EU 26 member states for the period of 1999-2012 (Georgantopoulos et al.,
2015). The conflicting evidence is in some way reconciled by more recent research that suggests
the existence of a threshold above which finance is irrelevant or even detrimental to growth and
show an inverted U-shaped relationship between private sector credit and GDP (Arcand et al.,
2015; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012). Furthermore, in the case of European countries the
inverted U-shaped relationship is more pronounced for the years right after 1999 (Arcand et al.,
2015). These findings are also supported by evidence on Central and Eastern Europe where rapid
credit expansion is found to be linked to macroeconomic imbalances such as current account
deficits, inflationary pressures and asset bubbles (Coudert and Pouvelle, 2010).
The structural roots approach stresses the importance of exploring the role of credit
access at disaggregated level: growth (and crisis) does not depend on the amount of finance or on
the financial innovation. Relevant factors are the behaviour of different actors (households vs
firms), how much finance is allocated to them, the reasons why it is allocated to them, how they
use it and how it stimulates the economic growth and avoid crisis (Caporale et al., 2015; Mian
and Sufi, 2014). Empirical research shows the diverse effects of household lending vs firm’s
lending on GDP growth (Beck et al., 2012), on the trade balance (Büyükkarabacak and Krause,
2009), and on banking crises (Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010). By looking at 10 new EU
members for the period 1994-2007, Caporale et al. (2015) show that productive capital
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accumulation is the best determinant for growth implying that it is mandatory for the financial
system to provide support to firms since they are the drivers for capital accumulation. The
growth enhancing route between finance, productive capital and GDP growth is also found by
Leblebicioğlu and Madariaga (2015) who provide evidence of financial flows and financial 
development on GDP growth through the composition of capital. Interestingly enough,
irrespective of the importance of allocating finance to capital accumulation, the financial
institutions seem to move in the opposite direction: approximately two thirds of the typical
banks’ business consist of household lending for real estate purposes to the point that “housing
finance has come to play a central role in the modern macro economy” (Jordà et al., 2016). The
proportion is definitely larger than one third at the beginning of the 20th century. The increase
may be possibly linked to the fact that in the pre-crisis period the practice of credit allocation
was progressively dissociated from household income standards (Mian and Sufi, 2014) to the
point that lending to households was provided without properly considering their income and
assets. However, it can also depend on the regulatory element (Basel agreements) that stresses
the importance of risk management and pushes banks to allocate finance towards low risk
investments (households’ mortgages are lower risk than firms’ loans). The result is a pre-crisis
growth characterized by limited productive investment and stationary wages, as suggested by the
declining shares of real household income over GDP aggravated by uneven income distribution
since the lowest income quintiles have the greatest marginal propensity to consume (Barba and
Pivetti, 2009; Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010; Stiglitz et al., 2009; Tridico, 2012). In such a context,
it is not a surprise that household leverage is found to be a good predictor for the US and
European financial crisis and subsequent recessions (Glick and Lansing, 2010, 2009; Mian and
Sufi, 2009; Mian et al., 2013). Caporale et al. (2015) have merit when, by stressing the current
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account imbalances, they argue for policies to slow down household credit and encourage better
allocation of credit to productive investments. All in all, the structural roots approach brings into
question the long-term sustainability of an economic system which moves away from productive
and income generating investment and relies on leveraging stable incomes to achieve growing
GDP. It stresses the negative effect of growth that is obtained via loose credit in a low growth
economy instead of economic expansion obtained by real household income growth that is a
consequence of financing productive investments (Summers, 2014).
Looking jointly at both the structural roots approach and the finance-led growth
approach, research suggests that excessive finance allocated to household may have a
detrimental effect on productive investment, and specifically on the growth of the stock of fixed
capital resulting into reduced household economic welfare and income (Jappelli and Pagano,
1994). The adverse effect may be amplified by two additional factors: diminishing total factor
productivity which relies on an unsound expansion of fixed capital (Caselli and Wilson, 2004;
De Long et al., 1992; De Long and Summers, 1991), and reduction in employment and real wage
levels determined by the pace and quality of capital formation (Arestis et al., 2007). Thus, both
the decisions about the amount/innovation of credit (finance-led approach) and the way in which
it is allocated between households vs. firms by the financial intermediary sector (structural root)
may play a key role in determining whether credit will assume its economic function as per the
Schumpeterian premise or it will lead to an unsustainable finance-led growth uncorrelated to
household income and productive investment.
Our analysis focuses on exploring whether financial intermediaries allocated the financial
resources in such a way that they created a fixed capital formation which was not productive
enough to generate the income to pay for the debt created. Thus, we explore whether a capital
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formation that is weighted towards residential construction, and financed through household
lending, promotes unsustainable GDP growth. Our analysis explores whether the mentioned
process and the related excessive household leverage has a direct “crowding out” effect on fixed
capital formation, via which it causes a GDP growth decoupled from real household income.
3. Sample Description and Variables
Our sample consists of the cross-section of 26 European countries for the period 1995-
2008 thus covering the period leading up to the financial crisis of 20081. For each country-year
observation we collect data from the publicly available Eurostat database. We construct a
number of variables as proxies of economic growth, capital composition and financial
development and use these variables on econometric specifications.
3.1 Dependent and Independent Variables
Our dependent variable is INC2GDP defined as the ratio of real household net disposable
income per capita (household final consumption expenditure and savings) to real GDP per capita
in the next period in relation to the same quantity in the previous period
   2    =          	   	          	      (   )   (   )
         	   	          	      ( )
   ( )
− 1
The ratio can be interpreted as the speed (and direction) at which the economy is able to
make GDP disposable to the households in the form of net disposable income. When the ratio is
greater than 0, it indicates an increase in households’ wealth: the households’ income in relation
to the GDP in the next period is greater that the household income in relation to the GDP of the
previous one. Thus, households are, economically speaking, better off in the sense that they
1In untubulated results we extend tests for the sample covering the period 1995-2012
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receive a higher proportion of the GDP. At the same time, when the ratio is negative,
households’ income in relation to the GDP in the next period is lower with respect the previous
period. This means that households benefit only marginally from the growth in the GDP and that
the “quota” of the GDP that is transferred onto them decreased. This metric is also a good proxy
of sustainable economic growth. In fact, as long as the ratio is stable around 0 or positive, there
is an alignment between GDP growth and households’ economic growth: GDP grows and the
increased wealth moves onto the households that are able to spend and invest supporting further
the economy. In other words, a trend in the ratio with values above zero suggests that the
economy is enjoying an organic and sustainable growth. At the same time a value of the ratio
below 0 implies a divergence of household income growth and GDP growth meaning a
decoupling of GDP growth from the households’ income growth. This suggests that GDP’s
growth is only fractionally transferred onto households and their capability to spend and invest
extra income in order to support further the economy is at least partially compromised. A trend
with ratios systematically below 0 reveals a divergent path between income and GDP, which is
deemed as an indication of an unbalanced and unsustainable growth (Barba and Pivetti, 2009;
Stiglitz et al., 2009).
We have a battery of independent variables that we expect to impact on our dependent
variable. HOUSECAP is defined as the growth of residential construction as a percentage of
gross fixed capital formation.
         =            	            (   )     	       (   )
           	            ( )
     	       ( )
− 1
It captures the speed at which the residential construction is expanding with respect to all other
kinds of fixed capital formation, possibly “crowding-out” investments in fixed assets,
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particularly investment in productive fixed capital linked to increases in household welfare (De
Long et al., 1992; De Long and Summers, 1991), wages and employment (Arestis et al., 2007). If
the ratio is above 0 it means that residential construction is growing faster than fixed capital
while if it is below 0, it means that its growth is slower than fixed capital. FIXEDASSETS is
defined as the growth of the sum of buildings other than residential construction (i.e. commercial
and industry), machines and equipment, equipment related to information and communication
technology, intellectual property products and biological resources as a percentage of total gross
fixed capital formation.
            =       (   )     	       (   )     ( )
     	       ( )
− 1
This ratio captures the speed at which the investment in productive assets is expanding with
respect to all types of fixed capital. HHLEVERAGE (i.e. household leverage) is the growth rate
of the ratio between household loans and household gross disposable income defined as the
amount of money that individuals (i.e. the household) have available for spending or saving. It is
important to point out that this variable is based on household gross disposable income while
INC2GDP is based on real household net disposable income.
           =          	     (   )         	     	          	      (   )         	     ( )
         	     	          	      ( )
− 1
This ratio explains whether households are expanding their dependence on debt finance
with respect to their income and thus it can be easily interpreted as an indicator of financial
fragility: positive HHLEVERAGE is associated with a higher proportion of income that has to be
used to repay loans. Thus, it grasps both the risks of excessive financial allocation towards
households and the financial risk linked to static wages. To capture the allocation of financial
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resources towards investments and income generating activities, we use CORPDEBT (i.e. debt of
firms excluding the financial institutions), equal to the growth of the ratio of firms’ loans to
GDP.
         =      	     (   )   (   )
     	     ( )
   ( )
− 1
The ratio can be interpreted as the support to firms provided by the financial system, i.e.
strong support through granting expanding credit (above 0) or weak support by constraining
credit (below 0). Finally, in order to account for the overall availability of credit at system level,
we use the growth rate of the yearly flow of new credit as a ratio of GDP (NCREDIT).
        =    	      (   )   (   )
   	      ( )
   ( )
− 1
This variable measures the speed at which additional (new) credit issued is added to the
stock of loans.
3.2 Controls
Based on models of endogenous growth (Barro, 1991) the empirical literature on finance-
growth has included several control variables which are known to affect economic growth such
as GDP, household income and fixed capital formation (for an overview see Beck et al. (2008).
In our specifications we include inflation (INFLATION), trade openness defined as imports plus
exports (TRADE), human capital as the average years of schooling (HUMANCAPITAL),
government expenditure scaled by GDP (GOVERNMENT) and the growth of the labour force
measured by the sum of unemployed and the employed (LABOUR).
4. Descriptive Statistics
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A set of descriptive statistics is reported in tables 1 and 2 giving distributional properties
of each variable as well as a first glimpse of their possible interactions.
------------------------
INSERT TABLE 1
------------------------
Looking at INC2GDP (table 1), our data shows a marked divergence of income growth
and GDP growth in the years leading up to the recession in 24 out of 26 countries in the sample.
Only two countries showed convergence, with four countries showing divergence between 1%
and 10%, five countries between 11% and 30%, nine countries between 31% and 60% and six
countries above 61% (with the greatest divergence being at 167%).
------------------------
INSERT TABLE 2
------------------------
Table 2 shows that on average INC2GDP (indicating whether the proportion of GDP as a
net income for families increases or decreases between two subsequent periods) is negative at an
average annual rate of -0.75%, for the period 1995-2007. The value suggests that households are
not better off since the proportion of GDP that is transformed in net disposable income decreases
on average during the period. Thus, GDP growth was unbalanced and unsustainable on the long
run.
Our aggregated proxy for average yearly new credit to the economy (NCREDIT) shows a
quite rapid growth at an annual rate of 13.30%. Interestingly, HHLEVERAGE grows by an
annual average of 11.70% whereas loans to firms’ (CORPDEBT), grows by 4.40% per year. This
suggests that the financial intermediary sector allocates financial resources mostly to households
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instead of firms. The divergence between GDP growth and household income on one hand and
of household leverage and firm debt on the other suggests similar divergence within the
formation of fixed capital. Interestingly, table 2 shows that on average residential construction
crowds-out fixed capital (e.g. information and communication technology, intellectual property
products and machinery) by an annual rate of around 3%: total fixed capital formation as a
percentage of GDP grew by 2.23% per annum (boosting GDP growth). However, this is led by
residential construction instead of productive investments. In fact, FIXEDASSETS, the set of
assets relating to production and innovation, shows a negative average growth of -0.50% as a
ratio of gross fixed capital formation. The evidence suggests a fixed capital formation growth
based on residential construction instead of productive investments. This aspect may be linked to
the strategies in terms of capital allocation pursued by the financial system. It could be claimed
that property is structurally highly correlated with household leverage since household leverage
largely overlaps with mortgage related lending. However, this does not necessarily imply a
systematic increase of housing as a portion of the total capital formation of an economy. Any
systematic increase in HOUSECAP in conjunction with a systematic decrease in FIXEDASSETS
signals an increasing risk for the future income of households (Arestis et al., 2007; Jappelli and
Pagano, 1994; Turner, 2015). The statistics provide indications towards the premise that increase
in household leverage could have an adverse effect on productive investment, in particular the
growth of the stock of fixed capital which in turn negatively affects household economic welfare
and income (Jappelli et al., 2005; Turner, 2015).
5. Results
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We start our testing by firstly examining the effects of financial development on the
divergence between household income growth and GDP. Our base specification consists of a
dynamic panel model with lagged dependent variable. Alternative econometric techniques can be
used to implement our analysis. Previous research suggests that OLS estimators on lagged
dependent variables in dynamic panel models are biased (Baltagi, 2008). This is discussed
extensively in relatively recent papers by Huang and Ritter (2009) as well as by Flannery and
Hankins (2013) who assess the efficacy of GMM-type estimators in comparison to OLS,
establishing the superiority of these estimators. We likewise refrain from presenting the analysis
based on OLS and rely on GMM-type estimators for the following regression:
   2    ,  =   +      2    ,    +               ,   +             ,   +
             ,   +              ,   +          ,   +             ,   +
  	            ,   +   	        ,   +    +    +   , 
All variables are measured in year t for country i, with    2    ,    representing the
lag-dependent variable in the dynamic panel model specification. The terms    and    capture
time-specific and country-specific effects respectively which are present in the panel data. Our
model is subject to endogeneity in the sense that the pronounced relationship between the
explained variable and the explanatory variables could be affected by reverse causality or/and
simultaneity. Furthermore, persistence in growth rates and the inclusion of the lag-dependent
variable (INC2GDP ,   ) are likely to induce serial autocorrelation while time invariant cross-
country effects make our results subject to heterogeneity. To address these issues in line with
(1)
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finance-growth literature (Beck et al., 2000; Calderón and Liu, 2003; Narayan and Narayan,
2013; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011) we initially employ a First-Differencing GMM methodology
in which lagged-transformed explanatory variables are used as valid instruments (Arellano and
Bond., 1991). While contemporaneous levels of the explanatory variables may be correlated with
the error term, their lagged values, conditional on other covariates, could be independent from
the error term due to a delay in the actualization of the contemporary dependent variable caused
by changes in the explanatory factors. The issue of autocorrelation is likely addressed by
instrumenting the lagged dependent variable with its past levels. To remove fixed effects, we
transform the regressors by first taking differences because country-specific effects are assumed
to be time–invariant. Alternatively, we transform lagged variables by the method of orthogonal
deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995), which has the advantage of preserving data points in
samples with time gaps. The method of orthogonal deviations is forward looking since instead of
subtracting the one-lagged observation from the current one to get the “difference”, it subtracts
the mean of all future available observations. Hence meaningful “differences” are available for
all but the last observation, regardless of time gaps. We control the proliferation of instruments
by specifying the number of lags used in the set of instruments to 2 and report relevant tests of
serial autocorrelation and overidentification. Our results confirm that serial autocorrelation is
present at the 1st lag but vanishes at the 2nd lag. Our tests uniformly pass the Hansen test of
overidentification.
Further to our “base-model” estimation we undertake the following robustness tests: first,
we re-estimate equation 1 by adding the legal origin of country as an additional external
instrument. The legal origin of each country is used to control for simultaneity bias by extracting
the exogenous component of financial intermediation development. The notion of legal origin as
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a valid instrument rests on the idea that most countries have obtained their legal systems through
“occupation” and therefore legal systems are exogenous to the development of country financial
intermediation. Moreover, since legal origin defines the contracting environment, which in turn
defines issues such as the rights of creditors, enforcement of debt contracts etc., it helps to
account for cross-country differences of financial intermediation development (La Porta et al.,
1998; Levine, 1999; Moro et al., 2016). Following Beck et al. (2000) we classify countries as
having either English, French, German or Scandinavian legal origin2.
Second, we employ two alternative dynamic panel estimators (with and without the legal
origin as external instrument). The first alternative is a System GMM (or SGMM) estimator with
Arellano/Bond-type instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The SGMM method presents the
advantage of increased efficiency using a system of equations, one differenced and one in levels,
to account for the case in which lagged regressors are poor instruments for the first-difference
equation. At the same time the SGMM generates a greater number of instruments using both
lagged-differences and lagged-levels with the penalty of potential overidentification. To that end
we report the Hansen test of overidentification and the number of instruments. The second
alternative is the Long Difference Estimator (Hahn et al., 2007) which accounts for higher orders
of serial correlation. We follow Huang and Ritter (2009) in providing a Long Difference
Estimator with 4 lags and 3 iterations (in which residuals from the first 2-passes are also
employed as instruments). In all our robustness tests results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Table 3 presents the results of model 1 estimated with the Difference-GMM method. In
columns (I)-(VI) we run the model “piecewise”, starting with a minimum of the three
explanatory variables (plus the lagged dependent variable) and progressively adding controls up
2A fifth classification of Socialist legal origin is not present in our dataset.
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to the full specification. This approach allows to examine the robustness of the results: if the
results are robust when additional controls are added, we can derive that the effect of the
explanatory variables is stable.
------------------------
INSERT TABLE 3
------------------------
The output shows that household leverage growth (HHLEVERAGE) and new yearly total
private sector credit growth (NCREDIT) are negatively related to INC2GDP and consistently
statistically significant at 1% throughout the regressions. This implies that an expansion of credit
in general (i.e. NCREDIT) as well as the increase in household leverage to finance the
acquisition of non-productive assets (HHLEVERAGE), have a negative impact on household
economic growth. In other words, credit expansion (financial led approach) as well as credit
expansion to households to buy non-productive assets (structural root approach) makes the
households worse off in the sense that they receive a decreasing quota of the GDP that, in turn,
represents a biased and unbalanced growth that can trigger an economic downturn. At the same
time the increase of the proportion of credit given to the firm (CORPDEBT) is positively related
to INC2GDP and almost everywhere statistically significant at a 10% level. This suggests that
the expansion of credit used to buy productive assets makes households better off as they may
enjoy an increase in their income that is greater than the increase of the GDP. This also implies a
coherent and balanced growth for the economy.
The results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables. Our tests reveal
strong 1st order autocorrelation (AR (I) tests) however residual autocorrelation vanishes at the 2nd
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lag (AR(II)). Robust standard errors are corrected. The Hansen  2 statistic satisfies the criterion
of overidentification.
Table 4 presents the robustness tests with regards to alternative dynamic-panel estimators
and the addition of legal origin as an external instrument.
------------------------
INSERT TABLE 4
------------------------
Panels A, B and C correspond to the Difference-GMM, SGMM and the Long
Differencing Estimator. Looking at the results of the SGMM estimator we note that the increased
number of instruments may result into a weaken Hansen test. In un-tabulated results we re-
estimate the specification with collapsed instruments. Our results are qualitatively identical.
Columns (I) in all panels omit the inclusion of legal origin as an external instrument while it is
included in Columns (II) in all panels. In all our robustness tests results remain consistent, with
HHLEVERAGE and NCREDIT exerting a negative and statistically strongly significant effect to
INC2GDP and CORPDEBT exerting a positive and statistically significant effect on INC2GDP.
Our findings support the view that specific financial intermediation practices, namely the
allocation of financial resources to households instead of firms, stimulate the phenomenon of the
decoupling of the household income with respect to GDP growth (diverging household
income/GDP growth). This emerges by looking at the negative effects of household leverage
growth and yearly new credit growth on the INC2GDP ratio. By contrast, firms’ debt exhibits a
positive effect towards convergence, leading to a balanced and sustainable growth. Elaborating
on the results of the full model in table 3 a negative effect of HHLEVERAGE of at least -0.0890
can be seen when all other factors are held constant. Likewise, the same increase in firms’ debt
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(CORPDEBT), it yields a positive effect on INC2GDP of 0.0290. This means that in the years of
credit expansion preceding the crisis, firms’ debt growth played a mitigating role. However, it
was not sufficient to support household income economic growth since the adverse effects of
allocation of credit towards households exceeded the benefits of productive debt. As such the
total private sector credit (NCREDIT) eventually exerted a negative effect of -0.0070 on the
INC2GDP ratio.
5.2 Split Regressions
The sample, comprising of 26 countries, is clearly subject to heterogeneity. While we
control for cross-country fixed effects through a difference-model and account for cross-country
differences of financial intermediary development through the inclusion of legal origin as an
exogenous instrumental variable, it is useful to assess whether our results are more strongly
pronounced in certain countries. To that end we generate three sample partitions where countries
are grouped according to be above or below the median value and run split regressions for the
full specification of equation 1. Table 5 gives the results.
------------------------
INSERT TABLE 5
------------------------
The first partition (Panel A) distinguishes between high/low GDP growth per year
countries. Although the pre-crisis years have been signified by high GDP growth across all
European countries, the average growth rates vary significantly, especially between the Eastern
and the Western European economies. Eastern European economies experienced on average
higher GDP growth than the Western European countries. The coefficient of HHLEVERAGE for
the lower growth countries (-0.2020) is nearly twice that of the higher growth countries (-0.1100)
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and the result is statistically significant at 1%. Moreover, CORPDEBT for the higher growth
countries becomes statistically insignificant while the coefficient for the lower growth countries
remains significant. This indicates that both the negative effects of household leverage and
positive effects of firms’ debt are larger in countries/years were GDP growth is below the
median of the all-country sample.
To confirm these effects of financial development on the more developed economies we
re-test further our model on two additional partitions. Firstly, we distinguish countries according
to their initial levels of household leverage. Then we separate the countries according to whether
they have adopted the Euro or not (Panel C). In order to capture the long-term effects of financial
liberalization due to the Euro membership, our partition is between countries which joined the
Euro in 1999 versus the countries joining the Euro in any later year.
In the case of the initial level of HHLEVERAGE (panel B), the negative effect on
INC2GDP is much more significant for the countries with a higher initial level of household
leverage (coefficient -0.2000) at the 1% level) compared to countries with lower initial
household leverage (coefficient -0.1120 at the 1% level). Moreover, CORPDEBT is statistically
not significant for the countries with low initial levels of household leverage, whereas for the
others it becomes statistically significant at the 5% level.
Regarding countries which joined the Euro in 1999, the evidence shows that the effect of
HHLEVERAGE is far greater for those that joined the Eurozone in 1999 (coefficient -0.1600 and
statistically significant at 1%) compared to the effect observed for the countries that joined the
Eurozone in later years (coefficient -0.1100 and statistically significant at 1%). Moreover, the
coefficient of CORPDEBT for the countries adopting the Euro in 1999 becomes significant at the
5% level while the same coefficient becomes not significant for the countries that joined the
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Eurozone in later years. This is in line with Arcand et al. (2015) who find that the inverted U-
shaped relationship of finance on growth is more pronounced in Europe following the 1999
inception of the Euro due to the corresponding financial liberalization.
5.3 Transmission Channels
We now try to determine the channels through which greater leverage may generate a
divergence of household income growth and GDP growth. In particular, we explore whether
household leverage may affect the composition of total fixed formation and thus lead to a GDP
growth decoupled from real-household income in line with the theory that increased household
leverage might negatively affect productive investment with repercussions on growth of fixed
capital formation and subsequent adverse effects on household welfare (Jappelli and Pagano,
1994), and with the evidence that the composition of capital matters for employment and wages
(Arestis et al., 2007). To account for the expansion in housing and its effects on the composition
of capital we have constructed the variable HOUSECAP, i.e. the growth of residential
construction as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation. Likewise, to capture the productive
component of capital formation we have introduced FIXEDASSETS. A “crowding-out” effect
implies that HHLEVERAGE should be positively related to HOUSECAP. In addition, the
“crowding-out” suggests a direct negative effect of HOUSECAP on INC2GDP, and hence an
indirect negative effect of HHLEVERAGE on INC2GDP via HOUSECAP.
The indirect association on INC2GDP by HOUSECAP via finance can be best formulated
in a 2 stage least squares system with fixed effects (2LS-FE). Similarly to Leblebicioğlu and 
Madariaga (2015), we estimate simultaneous regressions in which the first stage LS regresses
HOUSECAP on finance variables (HHLEVERAGE, CORPDET, NCREDIT) and in turn the
second stage LS regresses INC2GDP on HOUSECAP. As such, HOUSECAP is instrumented on
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HHLEVERAGE, CORPDEBT and NCREDIT. In both stages of the simultaneous regression we
retain the same vector of control variables as explained in equation 1.
Formally we estimate the following simultaneous regressions:
   2    ,  =    +             ,   +  ́(         , ) +    +    +   ,  (2a)
         ,  =    +               ,   +             ,   +            ,   +
 ́(         , ) +    +    +   ,  (2b)
The model above explores the link between INC2GDP and household debt. In order to
explore the analogous effects on INC2GDP by FIXEDASSETS via finance we estimate the
following simultaneous regression where the variable HOUSCECAP is substituted by the
variable FIXASSETS3:
   2    ,  =    +             ,   +  ́(         , ) +    +    +   ,  (3a)
         ,  =    +               ,   +             ,   +            ,   +
 ́(         , ) +    +    +   ,  (3b)
Finally, to capture the combined effect of HOUSECAP and FIXEDASSETS on
INC2GDP we estimate:
3 Equation 2a is analogous to equation 1. Because the lagged INC2GDP in our base results is
nowhere significant and to avoid issues of serial correlation in the FE2SLS the variable is simply
omitted.
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   2    ,  =    +             ,   +              ,   +  ́(         , ) +    +    +
  ,  (4)
where HOUSECAP and FIXEDASSETS are instrumented as in 2b and 3b. Table 6 reports the
results.
------------------------
INSERT TABLE 6
------------------------
Column (I) shows the effect of HOUSECAP on INC2GDP whereas HOUSECAP is
instrumented on the finance variables. From the 1st stage regression (2b) we obtain that the
strongest and more statistically significant effect on HOUSECAP comes, as expected, from
HHLEVERAGE. We therefore also include in our results the indirect effect of HHLEVERAGE on
INC2GDP obtained as        (eq. 2a, b). The indirect effect can be understood considering that:
a)     represents the impact of HHLEVERAGE produced on the first-stage regression (2b), and b)
    represents the impact of the fitted value of FIXEDCAP on INC2GDP captured in the second
stage regression (2a). Likewise, column (II) shows the effect of FIXEDASSETS on INC2GDP
while column (III) shows the combined effect of FIXEDASSETS and HOUSECAP (the indirect
effects of HHLEVERAGE are not repeated for clarity of exposition).
The results show that HOUSECAP has a significant negative effect of -0.3880 on
INC2GDP at 1% statistical significance level. The interpretation of the indirect effect is subtler:
first since the indirect effect is calculated as HOUSECAP over INC2GDP times HHLEVERAGE
over HOUSECAP and since the former is found to be -0.3880 it directly follows that the
coefficient of HHLEVERAGE over HOUSECAP is 0.2440. Hence, HHLEVERAGE is positively
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related to HOUSECAP suggesting a diversion of credit towards residential construction and un-
proportionately away from productive investments. An increase in HHLEVERAGE results in an
increase of 0.2440 in HOUSECAP which in turn promotes a reduction in INC2GDP (unbalanced
growth) of – 0.0950.
The results indicate a “crowding-out” effect where household leverage causes the
phenomenon of an increasing overall fixed capital formation characterized by an increasing share
of residential construction and decreasing share of productive assets. This finding is reinforced
when we look at FIXEDASSETS as the pipeline through which HHELEVERAGE exerts an effect
on INC2GDP. Specifically, the results show that FIXEDASSETS has a significant positive effect
of 1.177 on INC2GDP at 1% statistical significance level, while the indirect effect of
HHLEVERAGE through FIXEDASSETS remains negative. Analogously to the indirect effect of
HHLEVERAGE/HOUSECAP, we can infer that the coefficient of HHLEVERAGE over
FIXEDASSETS is negative and equal to -0.0290. Hence an increase in HHLEVERAGE decreases
FIXEDASSETS by -.0290 which in turn decreases INC2GDP by -0.0350.
All in all, our results suggest that household leverage for the years during the financial
expansion exerts a negative effect on sustainable economic growth through capital formation and
specifically by distorting the composition of capital: the increased household leverage drives
investments to unproductive assets (i.e. private properties).
5.4 Marginal Analysis
The importance of the relationships between household leverage, the composition of
fixed capital and sustainable growth can be further illustrated by looking at the comparative data
and corresponding marginal effects analysis (table 7) between the five European countries with
the slowest annual growth in household leverage (cluster A) and the countries with the fastest
29
growth in household leverage (cluster B) during the years of the financial boom preceding the
2007/2008 crash.
------------------------
INSERT TABLE 7
------------------------
The mean annual growth in household leverage of cluster A is on average 0.0250 per
annum whereas the mean annual growth in household leverage for cluster B is 0.3020. Based on
our preceding analysis it comes not at surprise that the corresponding INC2GDP for clusters A
and B is -0.0039 (low leverage growth) vs -0.0120 (high leverage growth), HOUSECAP is -
0.0006 (low leverage growth) 0.0700 (high leverage growth) and FIXEDASSETS is 0.0018 (low
leverage growth) vs -0.0116 (high leverage growth).
What emerges is that countries with a moderate household leverage growth has a near
parallel growth of household income to GDP ratio as well as a near parallel growth of the capital
formation of productive assets and residential construction. On the other hand, countries with a
high household leverage growth, show an unbalanced and unsustainable economic growth and
capital formation growth. In the case of capital formation residential construction is growing
much faster than the productive assets, and in the case of economic growth household income is
diverging significantly from GDP growth.
To explore the policy implications of our findings, we conduct a marginal effects analysis
based on our regression results and the actual country data. Column (I) illustrates the indirect
negative effects household leverage has on a household income growth through the significant
“crowding-out” effect it exerts on productive assets. Specifically, we observe that in the case
household leverage of cluster B to converge to cluster A, all other things equal, GDP growth
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would have been driven by household income growth to a greater extent, since the ratio between
the two would have turned from a negative of -0.0120 to a positive 0.0143. Moving on to column
(II) we see the direct impact of residential construction taking over fixed capital formation while
instrumented on financial development. Specifically, all other things being equal, if fixed capital
formation growth were not driven by residential construction at the annual pace of 0.0700, but
instead capital formation growth was based on the parallel growths of productive assets and
residential construction (HOUSECAP growth of -0.06 suggests that both residential construction
and productive assets are growing at almost the same pace with a marginal difference in favour
of the formation of productive assets), then household income would be on a converging path to
GDP growth of 0.0118 per annum rather than the diverging of -0.0120 per annum. In line with
this, we see from column (III) that for cluster B, household leverage was driving down the share
of productive assets to total assets by -0.0116 each year, whereas in the countries with moderate
growth of household leverage productive assets were moving together with residential
construction in boosting overall capital formation (with a slight lead by productive assets
formation of 0.0018 per year). In the case that cluster B would have converged from -0.0116 to
0.0018, all other things equal, then GDP growth would be in a correlated converging path to
household income at a yearly rate of 0.0037, instead of the factual yearly diverging path of -
0.0120.
6. Discussion
Previous research explored the links between finance and economic development/crisis
and proposes two major themes: the “finance-led” growth (and crisis) approach and the
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“structural roots” approach. We argue that both approaches have their own merits and that they
are not necessarily mutually excluding.
We find that the pure expansion of the credit does not support a balanced economic
expansion (“finance-led” approach). If anything, it tends to amplify the decoupling between GDP
growth and households’ income growth at the expenses of the latter. However, this is not the
entire story. Our results show the mechanism behind the growth which preceded the financial
crisis: it is characterized by lack of productive investment (Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Wisman,
2013) suggesting that lending and leverage are not the simple cause since what matters is also
who is leveraging and what they are leveraging for (structural roots approach). We show that if
leverage and lending are allocated in a balanced manner between households and firms, then
long term stable growth will be stimulated. This happens because lending is not decoupled from
income generating productivity which allows the future repayment of consumptive debt. At the
same time, if lending is mainly allocated to households and not used for productive investments,
new income streams cannot be created, and household borrowers will not be able to repay the
debt.
Our results suggest the dilemma faced by the financial system in making lending
decisions in terms of the chasm between the interest of the single bank in the short term and the
risk at systemic level in the long term. Lenders’ decisions are mainly focused on the
characteristic of the borrower: borrowers characterized by good collateral and a steady cash flow
are preferred to those that have poorer collateral and more uncertain cash flow (Diamond, 1984;
Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001). Historical evidence suggests that households tend to belong to
the former group while firms tend to belong to the latter. When households buy a property on the
one hand they have collateral that, in standard conditions, can be quite easily disposed by the
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bank if the borrower is delinquent and on the other hand households tend to count on a reliable
and stable cash flow linked to their jobs. When firms buy assets, they have collateral
characterized by quite a high level of specificity that cannot be so easily disposed to recover the
loans if firms turn to be delinquent (Almeida and Campello, 2007; Williamson, 1988). In
addition, the cash flows firms generate are less stable with respect the cash flow households can
rely on (Cressy, 2006). Thus, as far as the banks are concerned, it makes sense to expand lending
activities to households in order to reduce the risk incurred. However, when this behaviour is
pursued at systemic level, firms will be constrained in accessing the finance they need to buy
assets, expand production, and increase job opportunities (Kashyap and Stein, 2004; Martinelli,
1997; Piga and Atzeni, 2007): the economy will suffer. In other words, households’ lending, by
“crowding out” finance from firms, compromises a sustainable economic growth that has, in
turn, an adverse effect on the very same leveraged households. Households will face a lower
increase in salaries, higher probability to lose their job, lower opportunity to find a new job and
eventually difficulties or incapability to repay the loans. The economic system faces a breaking
point and historical evidence that suggests that households are low risk customers does not apply
anymore. The consequence is that the very same banks that decided to pursue a low risk strategy
in terms of lending (lend to households) are those that incur the higher risk (more exposed to
households’ delinquency). All in all, what can be a good strategy based on historical trends and
proved to be good in the short term, turns to be a very dangerous one in the long term; what is a
rational behaviour based on historical data at single lender level is an irrational behaviour at
systemic level so that the sum of n backward looking actors behaving rationally creates a
consequence where all the actors are worse off.
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To the best of our knowledge, the potential systemic risk embedded in the risk
minimization is not addressed in any way by the current bank regulation. If anything, current
regulation (e.g. Basel II and Basel III) indirectly tends to increase the long-term systemic risk. In
fact, current international and European banking regulations mainly stimulate banks to evaluate
the risk of their customer (probability of default) and on being properly hedged against the
potential loss (loss at default). Banks typically look at past data in order to estimate customer risk
at both single customer level and at group level. Thus, in order to set up a portfolio that reduces
the risk in terms of probability and loss at default, banks are implicitly stimulated to expand their
lending activity to households that are historically lower risk, even at the expense of the firms,
thus, increasing long term systemic risk. All in all, our evidence supports Caporale et al. (2015)
who argue for policies to slow down household credit and encourage better allocation of credit to
productive investments
7. Concluding remarks
The paper contributes to the extant literature by clarifying the role of financial
intermediation in inducing the European financial crisis of 2008. By showing the links behind
finance, capital formation and an economic growth decoupled from household income, we
illustrate the detrimental effects of a lending expansion (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) towards
households (Jordà et al., 2016; Mian and Sufi, 2014). More specifically for the European case,
we show that not only excessive lending but excessive household leverage through mortgage
lending too, exert a “crowding-out” effect on innovation and productive investments, ultimately
resulting in a negative impact on sustainable growth. As such, we help clarify the mechanisms
behind the decoupling of GDP growth to household income growth (Barba and Pivetti, 2009;
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Wisman, 2013), how financial intermediation can be detached from the real sector (Haiss et al.,
2016), and the ways in which bank credit may exert a negative effect on long-run growth
(Narayan and Narayan, 2013).
The evidence derived from this study stresses how financing choices grounded on past
data and trends and that are perfectly rational in the short term and for an individual bank can
structurally distort an economy and lead to unsustainable growth by not letting credit assume its
economic function of stimulus to productive investments. We show that excessive finance is not
a mere byproduct of an era characterized by limited productive investment and the divergence
paths of household income to GDP, or that finance, as such, causes instability in a structurally
sound system. Further, we show that excessive and rapid credit allocation towards households
and mortgages, can have structural implications on the economy. Our empirical investigation
suggests that sound capital allocation by the financial sector can promote a GDP growth and thus
the growth of consumption/production of goods based on the growth of household income, by
setting the underlining foundations based on productive capital formation. Moreover, we show
that an economic system can enjoy the benefits of both household leverage and a growing
housing sector only if it creates the necessary conditions to pay off the associated debt.
Our paper is subject to a number of caveats: despite our best efforts in econometric
estimation, the well-known predicament of finance/growth endogeneity cannot be fully resolved.
As such, while the strength of association in our variables is established conclusively, the causal
effects remain the property of economic interpretation. The time-series of our sample is limited
to the period 1995-2008. The time frame, while relevant to the crisis period, may not be long
enough to capture divergence from a sustainable path; medium run cycles with higher capital
accumulation may be present.
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Future research may be directed towards bank regulation concerned with the excessive
allocation of credit to singular categories of borrowers. It is important to stress that in-place bank
regulation focused on risk not only ignore the issue of productivity but also induce banks - acting
rationally - to expand credit towards mortgages and away from productive, yet riskier,
investments. As such, a mechanism that precludes the sum of short term risks reducing behaviour
from generating long-term systemic risk is much sought.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the dataset and context, our study indicates that proper
lending practices in terms of credit expansion and allocation of fin
ancial resources between households and firms might play a more important role than has
heretofore been acknowledged.
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Table 1: Divergence between Income Growth and GDP growth Per Country
Country
BaseYear Pre-Recession
Year
gINCOME gGDP Divergenceof Growth
Austria 1996 2007 17.5% 22.3% 27.6%
Belgium 1996 2007 12.0% 24.4% 103.0%
Bulgaria 2002 2008 33.8% 47.0% 39.2%
Croatia 2002 2008 22.2% 35.9% 62.0%
Cyprus 1996 2008 40.9% 41.8% 2.2%
CzechRep. 1996 2007 30.5% 43.8% 43.7%
Denmark 1996 2007 9.2% 24.5% 166.8%
Estonia 1996 2007 135.3% 177.4% 31.1%
Finland 1996 2008 43.2% 49.3% 14.0%
France 1996 2007 18.8% 20.4% 8.4%
Germany 1996 2007 4.8% 9.6% 99.3%
Hungary 1996 2007 34.2% 50.4% 47.7%
Ireland 2002 2008 17.9% 13.6% -24.0%
Italy 1996 2007 8.7% 17.9% 106.4%
Latvia 1996 2008 198.7% 211.7% 6.5%
Lithuania 1996 2008 158.7% 145.5% -8.30%
Luxembourg 2006 2008 4.3% 6.1% 40.4%
Netherlands 1996 2007 14.5% 33.8% 133.3%
Poland 1996 2008 41.8% 62.7% 49.8%
Portugal 1996 2008 24.2% 28.2% 16.5%
Romania 1998 2008 135.7% 155.2% 14.3%
Slovakia 1996 2008 46.7% 50.8% 8.7%
Slovenia 1996 2008 39.5% 55.3% 39.9%
Spain 2000 2008 13.5% 20.0% 48.3%
Sweden 1996 2008 30.5% 36.5% 19.6%
U.K 1996 2008 29.7% 43.6% 46.8%
Notes:This table presents country-wide statistics regarding the divergence of household income growth to GDP
growth. Base Year represents the first year of growth measurement. Pre-recession year represents the last year
before a specific country enters the financial crisis. gINCOME represents household income growth for the period
between the base year and the pre-recession year. gGDP represents GDP growth for the period between the base
year and the pre-recession year. Divergence of growth equals (gGDP/gINCOME) - 1.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Std
DV
5th Pctl 25th
Pctl
Media
n
75th
Pctl
95th
Pctl
INC2GDP (%) 272 -0.747 2.241 -3.800 -1.900 -0.700 0.250 2.700
HOUSECAP (%) 293 2.904 12.850 -12.800 -2.800 1.500 5.800 25.000
CORPDEBT (%) 289 4.377 9.306 -6.850 -1.084 3.808 8.594 17.867
HHLEVERAGE (%) 272 11.65 16.459 -6.092 3.305 7.114 16.000 47.446
NCREDIT (%) 264 13.25 53.582 -73.186 -11.519 13.584 38.913 105.20
FIXASSETS (%) 293 -0.453 5.586 -9.200 -2.300 -0.500 1.200 7.000
TFXCFORM (%) 293 2.23 2.99 -1.73 0.22 1.42 4.24 6.41
GDPPC (%) 305 4.050 3.920 2.927 3.243 3.938 4.155 5.982
Notes: This table presents detail statistics for all country-year observations for the period prior to the financial
crisis.INC2GDP equals growth in household net disposable income divided by GDP. HOUSECAP is a proxy of housing
fixed capital formation calculated as growth in residential construction divided by total gross fixed capital formation.
CORPDEBT is a proxy for growth in firms’ debt estimated as the growth in firms’ debt to GDP. HHLEVERAGE is a
proxy for growth in household leverage calculated as growth in household loans to household gross disposable income.
NCREDIT represents growth in annual credit flows for non-financial firms, non-profit institutions and households.
FIXEDASSETS is growth in fixed capital formation of productive assets by the sum of buildings other than residential
construction (i.e. commercial and industry), machines and equipment related to information and communication
technology, intellectual property products, cultivated biological resources and other machines & equipment divided by
total gross fixed capital formation. TFXCFORM is total fixed formation. GDPPC is real gross domestic product per
capita growth.
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Table 3: Difference-GMM regressions
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
L1_ INC2GDP 0.048 0.048 0.059 0.032 0.026 -0.001
(0.066) (0.091) (0.095) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098)
HHLEVERAGE -0.118*** -0.111*** -0.115*** -0.123*** -0.104*** -0.089***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
CORPDEBT 0.061* 0.025 0.059* 0.082* 0.022* 0.029*
(0.049) (0.047) (0.056) (0.062) (0.017) (0.018)
NCREDIT -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
INFLATION 0.187 0.213** 0.171* 0.176 0.267
(0.503) (0.083) (0.072) (0.179) (0.782)
TRADE -0.513 -0.901* -0.494 0.540
(4.309) (0.520) (0.618) (0.593)
HUMANCAPITAL 3.299** 2.851** 7.675
(0.104) (1.237) (14.910)
GOVERMENT 10.521 9.103**
(9.162) (0.1304)
LABOUR 0.140
(0.151)
N. of Instruments 44 44 44 44 44 44
AR(I) z -2.58*** -2.60*** -2.55** -2.31** -2.42** -2.33**
(p-val) (0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019)
AR(II) z -1.13 -1.01 -0.93 -0.65 -0.42 0.14
(p-val) (0.258) (0.312) (0.352) (0.515) (0.674) (0.889)
Hansen chi2 22.17 18.50 22.03 22.27 19.23 17.79
(p-val) (0.178) (0.295) (0.133) (0.121) (0.156) ( 0.165)
Notes: This table gives regression results for models I-V with INC2GDP the dependent variable. INC2GDP equals
growth in real household net disposable income per capita divided by real GDP per capita. INFLATION is natural log
of 1+ country/year inflation rate. TRADE is a proxy of trade openness and equals the natural log of exports plus
imports, the sum scaled by GDP. HUMANCAPITAL is a proxy of human capital and is calculated as the natural log
of average years of schooling. GOVERNMENT is the natural log of total government expenditure scaled by GDP.
LABOR is the growth (log difference) in labor force defined as the sum of employed and unemployed persons.
CORPDEBT is a proxy for growth (log difference) in firms’ debt estimated as the growth in firms’ debt to GDP.
HHLEVERAGE is a proxy for growth (log difference) in household leverage calculated as growth in household loans
to household gross disposable income. NCREDIT represents growth (log difference) in annual credit flows for non-
financial firms, non-profit institutions and households. Refer to section III for a detailed description of the variables.
Coefficients correspond to Difference-GMM regressions with lagged-transformed explanatory variables as valid
instruments ( Arellano and Bond, 1991). Lagged variables are transformed by the method of orthogonal deviations
(Arellano and Bover, 1995. Figures in brackets correspond to Windmeijer (2005) robust errors. The superscripts ***,
**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. AR(I), AR(II) are tests of serial correlation of
order 1 and 2 using residuals of first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1), under the null of no serial
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Table 4: Alternative Dynamic Panel Estimators and External Instrument
correlation. The Hansen statistic corresponds to a test of over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as
x2under the null hypothesis of that the joint exogeneity of the instruments is satisfied.
Panel A: Diff -GMM Panel B:SGMM Panel C: LD4
Estimator
(I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II)
L1_ INC2GDP -0.001 -0.054 0.013 0.004 -0.087 -0.001
(0.098) (0.084) (0.097) (0.098) (0.247) (0.361)
HHLEVERAGE -0.089*** -0.081*** -0.096*** -0.091*** -0.057** -0.094***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.019) (0.029) (<0.001)
CORPDEBT 0.029* 0.034* 0.054** 0.071** 0.082** 0.059**
(0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.037) (0.024)
NCREDIT -0.007*** -0.009** -0.007** -0.008*** -0.007** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (<0.001)
INFLATION 0.267 0.714 0.801 0.181 0.133 0.484
(0.782) (1.198) (0.503) (0.525) (0.194) (0.527)
TRADE 0.540 0.580 0.503 0.854 0.763** -1.946
(0.593) (0.459) (1.270) (1.004) (0.256) (2.672)
HUMANCAPITAL 7.675 2.214* 3.425 1.860 3.726 8.147
(14.910) (0.995) (2.330) (2.779) (5.810) (7.863)
GOVERMENT 9.103** 5.618 3.852** 2.883 7.631 4.156
(0.1304) (7.795) (1.974) (2.215) (4.778) (4.657)
LABOUR 0.140 0.145 0.126 0.143 0.008 0.058
(0.151) (0.138) (0.791) (0.136) (0.013) (0.122)
N. of Instruments 44 60 89 124
AR(I) z -2.33** -2.82*** -2.39** -3.03*** n.diff=4 n.diff=4
(0.019) (0.004) (0.016) (0.002)
AR(II) z 0.14 -0.37 0.22 -0.60 n.iter=3 n.iter=3
(0.889) (0.711) (0.825) (0.548)
Hansen chi2 17.79 17.95 19.07 19.87 18.52 21.31
( 0.165) (0.206) (0.641) (0.704)
Notes: The table gives results from alternative dynamic panel estimation methods by means of robustness. Panel A
corresponds to first-differencing GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) where lagged variables are transformed by the
method of orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Panel B corresponds to System-GMM with lagged-
transformed explanatory variables as valid instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Lagged variables are
transformed by the method of orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Panel C corresponds to the Long
Differencing Estimator (Hahn et al.'s, 2007) using 4 periods for differencing (Huang and Ritter, 2009) and 3
iterations. Model (I) in all panels uses lagged-transformed explanatory variables as valid instruments. Model (II) in
all panels adds legal origin as an external instrument (Beck et al, 2000). All variables are as defined in table 3. The
superscripts ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. AR(I), AR(II), where
reported, are tests of serial correlation of order 1 and 2 using residuals of first differences, asymptotically distributed
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as N(0,1), under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen statistic corresponds to a test of over-identifying
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as x2under the null hypothesis of that the joint exogeneity of the instruments
is satisfied.
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Table 5: Split Regressions
PANEL A: Split Regressions based on GDP growth
L1_ INC2GDP HHLEVG CORPDEBT NCREDIT INFLATION TRADE HCAPITAL GOVERNT LABOUR
High
-0.013 -0.110*** 0.025 -0.144 -0.687 -0.087 2.625* 8.962 0.174*
(0.082) (0.003) (0.068) (0.505) (0.892) (0.517) (1.464) (8.281) (0.143)
Low
0.016 -0.202** 0.020* -0.194 0.703 9.608 -1.974 2.157 4.279
(0.136) (0.082) (0.013) (0.847) (1.639) (6.214) (1.271) (1.518) (4.631)
PANEL B: Split Regressions based Initial Level of Household Leverage
L1_ INC2GDP HHLEVG CORPDEBT NCREDIT INFLATION TRADE HCAPITAL GOVERNT LABOUR
High
0.022 -0.200*** 0.136** -0.152 0.177 1.356 0.789 14.441 -3.306
(0.093) (0.094) (0.058) (0.565) (0.848) (1.064) (2.677) (14.567) (4.772)
Low
-0.019 -0.112*** 0.045 -0.058 -0.147 0.579 13.475 11.550 0.166
(0.045) (0.024) (0.036) (0.083) (0.105) (0.438) (7.993) (7.993) (0.171)
PANEL C: Split Regressions based on 1999 EUROZONE Membership
L1_ INC2GDP HHLEVG CORPDEBT NCREDIT INFLATION TRADE HCAPITAL GOVERNT LABOUR
YES
0.012 -0.160*** 0.059** -0.159 0.216 1.143 2.698 28.239** -25.651
(0.076) (0.081) (0.018) (0.458) (0.121) (6.229) (2.443) (11.884) (41.845)
NO
-0.014 -0.110*** 0.025 -0.726 -0.174 2.378 2.953* 12.017 0.147
(0.064) (0.002) (0.066) (0.627) (0.850) (3.659) (1.432) (8.731) (0.154)
Notes: This table gives split regression results for equation 1 with INC2GDP the dependent variable. Panel A presents split regression results for the high and low GDP
growth portfolios. Panel B presents split regression results on the basis of 1999 country membership in the Eurozone, or not. Panel C presents split regression results for
the high/low initial level of household leverage. INC2GDP equals growth in household net disposable income pc divided by GDP pc. INFLATION is natural log of 1+
country/year inflation rate. TRADE is a proxy of trade openness and equals the natural log of exports plus imports, the sum scaled by GDP. HUMANCAPITAL is a proxy
of human capital and is calculated as the natural log of average years of schooling. GOVERNMENT is the natural log of total government expenditure scaled by GDP.
LABOR is the growth (log diff.) in labor force defined as the sum of employed and unemployed persons. CORPDEBT is a proxy for growth (log diff.) in firms’ debt
estimated as the growth in firms’ debt to GDP. HHLEVERAGE is a proxy for growth (log diff.) in household leverage calculated as growth in household loans to
household gross disposable income. NCREDIT represents growth (log diff.) in annual credit flows for non-financial firms, non-profit institutions and households.
Coefficients correspond to Difference-GMM regressions with lagged-transformed explanatory variables as valid instruments ( Arellano and Bond, 1991). Lagged
variables are transformed by the method of orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995. Figures in brackets correspond to Windmeijer (2005) robust errors. The
superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Unreported AR (II) tests reject the null of serial residual correlation once
residuals are differences, while (unreported) Hansen tests reject the null of over identification.
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Table 6: 2SLS regressions: Relation between INC2GDP and composition of capital
(I) (II) (III)
INFLATION 0.374 0.302 0.528
(0.632) (0.713) (0.513)
TRADE -0.421 -3.087* -3.265*
(0.925) (0.077) (0.052)
HUMANCAPITAL 9.047 12.21** 12.51**
(0.430) (0.028) (0.019)
GOVERMENT 5.028 -0.210 -2.505
(0.484) (0.946) (0.465)
LABOR -0.136 -0.186 -0.233
(0.863) (0.850) (0.805)
HOUSECAP -0.388*** -0.216
(0.003) (0.179)
FIXASSETS 1.177*** 0.881**
(0.005) (0.050)
Indirect Effect of
HHLEVERAGE
-0.095*** -0.035***
(<0.001) (<0.001)
Wald chi2 15.61 8.21 15.0
Prob > chi2 (0.029) (0.223) (0.059)
Notes: This table gives regression results for models I-III with INC2GDP the dependent variable. INC2GDP equals
growth in real household net disposable income per capita divided by real GDP per capita. INFLATION is natural log
of 1+ country/year inflation rate. TRADE is a proxy of trade openness and equals the natural log of exports plus
imports, the sum scaled by GDP. HUMANCAPITAL is a proxy of human capital and is calculated as the natural log
of average years of schooling. GOVERNMENT is the natural log of total government expenditure scaled by GDP.
LABOR is the growth (log difference) in labor force defined as the sum of employed and unemployed persons.
HOUSECAP is a proxy of housing fixed capital formation calculated as growth (log difference) in residential
construction divided by gross fixed capital formation. FIXASSETS is the growth (log difference) of the sum of
buildings other than residential construction (i.e. commercial and industry), machines and equipment related to
information and communication technology, intellectual property products, cultivated biological resources and other
machines &equipment. Refer to section III for a detailed description of the variables. Regressions coefficients
correspond to FE-2SLS estimators as in Semykina and Wooldridge (2010). We estimate the system of equations 3a,
3b (column I), 4a, b (Column II) and the system of equations 5 (column II).Indirect effect of HHLEVERAGE equals
       for model (I) or model(II). The superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table 7: Marginal effects analysis on INC2GDP
(I) (II) (III)
INC2GDP HHLEVERAGE HOUSECAP FIXASSETS
Description of Marginal Effect
Indirect effect of
HHLEVERAGE
on INC2GDP
through
HOUSECAP
Direct Effect of
HOUSECAP on
INC2GDP while
instrumented on
HHELEVERAGE
Direct Effect of
HOUSECAP on
INC2GDP while
instrumented on
HHELEVERAGE
Regression Coefficient (Table 5) -0.095 -0.338 1.177
Mean of 5 countries with Lowest
HHLEVERAGE (A) (%) -0.39 2.51 -0.06 0.18
Mean of 5 countries with Highest
HHLEVERAGE (B) (%) -1.20 30.24 7.00 -1.16
Low minus High (A-B) (%) 0.81 -27.73 -7.06 1.33
Incremental Effect on INC2GDP :
C=(A-B) x Coefficient
2.63 2.39 1.57
Projected INC2GDP of High
HHLEVERAGE countries upon
convergence to Low
HHLEVERAGE levels: C+B (%)
1.43 1.18 0.37
Notes: Cluster of the five countries with the Highest HHLEVERAGE: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Lettonia. Cluster of the five
countries with the Lowest HHLEVERAGE: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, and Germany.
